What matters in survival : personal identity and other possibilities / by Douglas Ehring.
Material type: Computer fileLanguage: English Publication details: Oxford : Oxford University Press USA - OSO, 2021Description: 1 online resource (226, pages) : color illustrationsContent type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9780191915598 (e-book)
- BD236 Eh8 2021
Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Materials specified | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Online E-Books | Ladislao N. Diwa Memorial Library Multimedia Section | Non-fiction | OEBP BD236 Eh8 2021 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | PAV | OEBP000202 | ||
Compact Discs | Ladislao N. Diwa Memorial Library Multimedia Section | Non-fiction | EB BD236 Eh8 2021 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Room use only | PAV | EB000202 |
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Include bibliographical references and index
Introduction -- 1. The divergence argument -- 2. Fission and shared stages -- 3. Fission and indeterminacy -- 4. Generalizing from fission -- 5. The triviality argument -- 6. The non-triviality principle and objections to its application
This work is about what matters in survival, that is, about what relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual. For common sense there is such a relation and it is identity, but according to Parfit, common sense is wrong in this respect. Identity is not what matters in survival. In this work, it is argued that this Parfitian thesis, revolutionary though it is, does not go far enough. The result is the highly radical view, “Survival Nihilism,” according to which nothing matters in survival. Although we generally have motivating reasons to have prudential concern, and perhaps even indirect normative reasons for such concerns—such as a commitment to find a vaccine for the Covid-19 virus—there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern. This view goes beyond what Parfit calls the Extreme View. It is the More Extreme View, and is, in effect, something like an error theory about prudential reason as a special kind of normative reason.
Fund 164 CE-Logic Purchased Feb 16, 2022 OEBP000202 P. Roderno PHP 13,442.50
2022-02-057 22-1054