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What matters in survival : personal identity and other possibilities / by Douglas Ehring.

By: Material type: Computer fileComputer fileLanguage: English Publication details: Oxford : Oxford University Press USA - OSO, 2021Description: 1 online resource (226, pages) : color illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780191915598 (e-book)
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • BD236  Eh8 2021
Online resources:
Contents:
Introduction -- 1. The divergence argument -- 2. Fission and shared stages -- 3. Fission and indeterminacy -- 4. Generalizing from fission -- 5. The triviality argument -- 6. The non-triviality principle and objections to its application
Summary: This work is about what matters in survival, that is, about what relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual. For common sense there is such a relation and it is identity, but according to Parfit, common sense is wrong in this respect. Identity is not what matters in survival. In this work, it is argued that this Parfitian thesis, revolutionary though it is, does not go far enough. The result is the highly radical view, “Survival Nihilism,” according to which nothing matters in survival. Although we generally have motivating reasons to have prudential concern, and perhaps even indirect normative reasons for such concerns—such as a commitment to find a vaccine for the Covid-19 virus—there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern. This view goes beyond what Parfit calls the Extreme View. It is the More Extreme View, and is, in effect, something like an error theory about prudential reason as a special kind of normative reason.
List(s) this item appears in: NEW Online E-Books 2023
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Item type Current library Collection Call number Materials specified Status Notes Date due Barcode
Online E-Books Online E-Books Ladislao N. Diwa Memorial Library Multimedia Section Non-fiction OEBP BD236 Eh8 2021 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available PAV OEBP000202
Compact Discs Compact Discs Ladislao N. Diwa Memorial Library Multimedia Section Non-fiction EB BD236 Eh8 2021 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Room use only PAV EB000202

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Introduction -- 1. The divergence argument -- 2. Fission and shared stages -- 3. Fission and indeterminacy -- 4. Generalizing from fission -- 5. The triviality argument -- 6. The non-triviality principle and objections to its application

This work is about what matters in survival, that is, about what relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual. For common sense there is such a relation and it is identity, but according to Parfit, common sense is wrong in this respect. Identity is not what matters in survival. In this work, it is argued that this Parfitian thesis, revolutionary though it is, does not go far enough. The result is the highly radical view, “Survival Nihilism,” according to which nothing matters in survival. Although we generally have motivating reasons to have prudential concern, and perhaps even indirect normative reasons for such concerns—such as a commitment to find a vaccine for the Covid-19 virus—there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern. This view goes beyond what Parfit calls the Extreme View. It is the More Extreme View, and is, in effect, something like an error theory about prudential reason as a special kind of normative reason.

Fund 164 CE-Logic Purchased Feb 16, 2022 OEBP000202 P. Roderno PHP 13,442.50
2022-02-057 22-1054

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